STATEMENT
OF
CAPTAIN
STEPHEN LUCKEY, CHAIRMAN
NATIONAL FLIGHT SECURITY COMMITTEE
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
BEFORE
THE
COMMITTEE
ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
U.S.
SENATE
ON
AVIATION
SECURITY
JULY
25, 2002
Good morning. I am Captain Stephen Luckey, chairman of the Air Line Pilots
Association International’s National Flight Security Committee. ALPA is the nation’s largest pilot union,
representing more than 67,000 pilots who fly for 43 airlines in the U.S. and
Canada. We are appreciative of the
Committee’s interest in the subject of aviation security and for soliciting our
views on it.
It is no secret that the Transportation
Security Administration is struggling to perform the job that it has been
assigned by Congress. The tasks of
building a new security agency and complying with the numerous mandates given
it are monumental. However, the work
has been greatly hampered by the agency’s demonstrated unwillingness to
coordinate and work with the aviation industry on virtually anything. The recent resignation of the Transportation
Security Administration’s (TSA’s) Under Secretary, John Magaw, undoubtedly
creates greater short-term turmoil.
However, we are hopeful that under the guidance of the new Under
Secretary, James Loy, the TSA will begin to initiate serious efforts to build
partnerships with the aviation industry that will lead to genuine progress on
needed security reforms.
In my testimony today, I would like to
speak to three specific issues that are important to our members, namely, the
federal flight deck officer program, access control and identity verification
systems, and cargo security.
Federal
Flight Deck Officers
The subject of arming pilots is one that
has generated significant public debate and no small amount of
misunderstanding. I am confident that
we can build a strong case for our position today, which ALPA was the first to
recommend to Congress last September, and at the same time help to clear up
some pervasive misconceptions surrounding this topic.
My further remarks contain rebuttals to
some of the more common arguments raised against arming pilots, but I would at
this time like to rebut the most politically charged argument voiced against
this program. That argument says that
pilots should not be armed because doing so would introduce tens of thousands
of new weapons into our society. This
statement is both specious and misleading because the individuals who will bear
those arms will be sworn law enforcement officers who are armed for the
defense of their limited, cockpit jurisdiction and, ultimately the protection
of the passengers for whom they are responsible. We doubt that the proponents of such an argument have given due
consideration to its full ramifications, but suffice it to say that we see no
point in comparing the arming of sworn federal agents with the arming of the
general population.
I would like to offer a perspective on
the need for arming pilots that perhaps you have not considered. Eight pilots were killed on September
11th. The deaths of those eight pilots
resulted in the transfer of aircraft control from authorized crewmembers to
terrorists bent on destroying our country and its people. More than 3,000 people were murdered,
billions of dollars of property damage was incurred, the nation’s economy was
rocked and is still suffering, thousands of people were laid off, and billions
of dollars of new spending will be allocated to security both in this country
and around the globe for years to come – all because eight pilots were killed. It is obvious, or should be, that protecting
the flight deck and its occupants against hijackers is now tantamount to
protecting our national economy. We are
convinced that the ailing airline industry, which is still profusely
hemorrhaging red ink, could virtually disappear if another successful attack is
launched against us. If the airline
industry takes another downward spiral, it most certainly will harm hundreds of
businesses as well.
The real tragedy in all of this is that
the hijackings of September 11th were avoidable. More than 40 years ago, during
the height of the Cuban hijacking crisis, we called for strengthening flight
deck doors and arming pilots, among other measures. In 1961, the FAA amended federal aviation regulations, with Congressional
support, to permit pilots to be armed with the consent of their airline but the
agency removed that regulatory language in July 2001. Senate bill S. 2554 will restore the framework of, and improve
upon, what was so recently removed from federal regulations.
An Ongoing Threat
To underscore the risks that we face, I
would like to pose three questions and follow them with the answers. First, is there still a risk of terrorists
assuming control of an airliner and crashing it into a building? The answer that we are hearing from the
Justice Department, the Office of Homeland Defense, the TSA and numerous other
sources is an emphatic "yes."
Transport aircraft, regardless of whether they carry passengers or
cargo, must from now on be viewed as potential human-guided missiles if they
fall into the hands of a suicidal terrorist.
Osama bin Laden’s henchmen were remarkably patient, thorough, as well
trained as any special operations unit in the world, and employed surprise
attacks to great advantage using relatively innocuous weapons that they knew
would go unchallenged through security checkpoints. From their perspective, the operation was a great success, not
only in terms of damage, but also with respect to the amount of global media
attention their acts garnered. History
has shown that terrorists endeavor to repeat successes, so we must prudently
assume that our enemies are planning for yet another airliner attack.
Second, if terrorists board an aircraft
with the intention of hijacking it, will they be armed only with box cutters as
they were before? We think that the
answer to that is "probably not."
The element of surprise from a box cutter-type attack is gone and small
knives are now confiscated at security checkpoints, so we must assume that terrorists
will be armed with some other weapons, which could include guns not taken
through screening checkpoints and/or undetected explosives.
We have an unfortunate habit in this
country of preparing for the type of security breach that most recently occurred
– this is the equivalent of locking the barn door after the horse has been
stolen. What we must do instead is address, to the best of our knowledge and
ability, all of the potential threats that exist, not just those that we
have most recently experienced. Many in
the airline industry and some in government seem to believe that we should not
prepare to counter anything but close-quarters combat by unarmed
assailants. Such tunnel vision is
foolhardy and leaves us pitifully unprepared for the various types of hijacking
attempts that may well lie ahead.
Lastly, do we possess the will to do all
that we can to avoid another catastrophe?
I can tell you without equivocation that many pilots are willing and
prepared to assume the responsibility for training and carrying a weapon. They are willing to do so as both a
deterrent against hijacking attempts and as a means of preventing an attempt
from becoming successful. The U.S. House of Representatives has demonstrated
with its vote on H.R. 4635 that it is resolved to avoid another
catastrophe. We believe that the Senate
should also take such a stand, which will have a strong deterrent effect
against future hijackings and help restore the confidence of the traveling
public in aviation.
You may be interested to know that I am
one of about a dozen pilots selected in the mid-1970’s to be trained by the FBI
to carry a firearm while performing my duties as a pilot. My airline’s
president and the FAA approved that carriage to protect against the hijackings
that were prevalent then. From my
personal experience, I can tell you that I did not particularly enjoy being
armed during the 15 years that I carried a firearm – but it was a duty that I
voluntarily undertook. The weapon was worn at all times, which is an
inconvenience, and there was definitely an increased level of responsibility
and restriction of my activity that went with being armed. However, I thought
that it was necessary to be armed then, and I believe that it is even more
necessary for qualified and properly trained pilots to be armed now. We could wish that our threat situation was
such that it would be unnecessary for pilots to be armed, but the events of
September 11th and the ongoing threat of further violence against airlines make
it a necessity, in our view.
Misconceptions
There are many misconceptions about the
provisions of S. 2554, although there are fewer now than when we first proposed
the arming of pilots. It should be
common knowledge, but in case it is not, we have never recommended arming all
pilots or making the arming of pilots a condition of employment. Rather, the federal flight deck officer
program requires that pilots:
Ø
Volunteer to
participate. Only pilots who volunteer to subject
themselves to individual scrutiny, intense security training, proficiency
testing, and the responsibility that goes with carrying a firearm would be
allowed to enter the program. Having
carried a firearm on the flight deck, I know the challenges that must be met in
order to make this program work. Stated another way, however, I know from
firsthand experience that arming pilots can work and that doing so in
2002 will merely build on what has been done successfully before.
Ø
Be selected for
training only after meeting strict, federal qualification standards. Each pilot who volunteers to become a
federal flight deck officer would be professionally evaluated, like other
federal law enforcement officer candidates, to determine aptitude for carrying
and firing a weapon, exercising judgment, using lethal force against an
attacker, and other abilities. We do not expect that everyone who desires to be
armed will be armed, due to the need to meet the very highest law enforcement
standards. However, many in our ranks are former military and law enforcement
officers, or have other pertinent qualifications, and are quite familiar and
experienced with firearms. Those individuals will make excellent candidates as
federal flight deck officers.
Ø
Undergo
training, provided by a federal law enforcement agency, specific to protecting
the flight deck. Candidates should
be provided approximately 48 hours of comprehensive training on all subjects
pertaining to defense of the flight deck. These would include lessons on the
law, the continuum of force, firearms training from a seated position and at
close range, tactics and other related topics. We have recommended setting the
shooting proficiency standard at 100%, higher than any law enforcement officer
is required to meet. Doing so will provide a very high confidence level by the
TSA and the flying public that the federal flight deck officer is prepared to
protect the flight deck in the safest manner possible.
Ø
Be deputized as
federal officers with jurisdiction restricted to the flight deck. Pilots would be given jurisdiction only to
make arrests and take defensive actions for acts of interference with, or
assault upon, the flight crew in the flight deck. Pilots will not be trained to nor tasked with discharging their
weapon in the cabin.
Reasons to
Protect the Flight Deck with Federal Flight Deck Officers
Reasonable people may disagree about the
need for arming pilots to protect the flight deck, but we are convinced that
very strong arguments can be made in favor of creating the federal flight deck
officer program:
Ø
It would
protect aviation’s most important zone of defense – the flight deck. The U.S.
Secret Service provides protection to VIPs using what they refer to as zones of
defense. A VIP is protected by the most concentrated forces within the
innermost zone. The flight deck is the inner, and most important, zone of
defense for aviation security. Security measures are needed to protect the
outer zones, such as explosive detection equipment and better training, but
they are not a substitute for protecting the inner zone. Ultimately, if a
terrorist is able to penetrate other zones of defense and enter the flight
deck, the pilots need the proper resource – in this case, a firearm – to
respond forcefully and successfully to such a life-threatening emergency.
Ø
It may prevent
the need for a U.S. fighter airplane to shoot down an airliner full of innocent
passengers and crewmembers. An illogical conundrum has been
unintentionally created by the Administration’s failure to act decisively to
arm pilots. Pilots are not empowered to defend themselves against hijackers,
but our own fighter aircraft, sometimes flown by military reserve airline
pilots, will be dispatched to shoot down an airliner if hijackers gain control
of it. We believe that our pilots should be provided the resources that they
need to defend themselves against terrorists so that they and their passengers
are at less risk of being shot down by our own military.
Ø
It will create
a high level of deterrence. Once terrorists learn that the U.S. has decided
to begin arming pilots, commercial aviation becomes a much less inviting
target, which is exactly what is needed. Even if only a fraction of the flights
have one or more armed flight deck officers, terrorists will be unable to
determine which ones are not protected. Ultimately, this deterrence will also
reduce the likelihood that a pilot will ever need to fire a weapon while on the
aircraft.
Ø
The program
will be highly effective and efficient. The flight deck officer program will
not require the creation of a new, paid workforce. We can think of no other
countermeasure against hijackings that comes close to the effectiveness and
efficiency of using pilots to defend their own workplace. No one has a greater
interest in doing so, and no one will take it more seriously.
Ø
Pilots are
exceptionally well-suited for protecting the flight deck. We believe
that no one is more highly qualified for protecting the flight deck than
pilots. Pilots are undoubtedly the most highly scrutinized employees in the
work force, submitting to a battery of pre-employment evaluations, a flight
physical every six months, random drug and alcohol testing, and a criminal
history records check, among other formal examinations. Additionally, pilots
are constantly interacting with and undergoing de facto monitoring by
their airline’s management, their peers, FAA personnel, and others.
Pilots’
high level of discipline, attention to detail and ability to adhere to strict,
standardized protocols lend very favorably to proficiency in safe, firearms handling.
Furthermore, many pilots have former law enforcement or military backgrounds.
We doubt that anyone is prepared to raise a reasonable concern about arming an
airline pilot who formerly served as an FBI special agent or decorated special
forces operative – these are the kinds of individuals who are prepared to serve
as federal flight deck officers.
Ø
The public
supports it. Numerous polls of the general public have
been taken to gauge support for arming pilots. Each of the polls that we have
seen has indicated a high level of approval for letting pilots defend
themselves in their workplace. This is in spite of the fact that the citizenry
has little, if any, knowledge of the safeguards that will be built into this
program. Returning the airline industry to strong profitability and growth
depends on bringing passengers back to the airplanes. Passengers are unlikely
to return to pre-September 11th traffic levels unless and until they are
confident about security. The passengers will not gain that confidence until
they see evidence that pilots express the view that they are well equipped to
counter any hijacking attempt.
Rebuttals to
Arguments Against Arming Pilots
It has been our experience that the more
an individual knows about the federal flight deck officer program, the more
likely they are to support it. We have
found this to be true even within our own ranks. Those who are less familiar with the program have raised several
arguments against arming pilots that deserve to be addressed. Following are a few of the more commonly
raised arguments against a flight deck protection program, and our answers to
them.
Ø
New cockpit
doors make arming of pilots unnecessary. The newly designed, enhanced-security
doors that are required by the FAA are not yet installed on the U.S. airline
fleet, and that task will not be completed until at least April 2003. Neither
the current cockpit doors (with interim measures in place to strengthen them)
nor the new cockpit doors are impenetrable, and we are convinced that a team of
trained terrorists could well decide to prove that point.
Furthermore,
airliners will have only one hardened cockpit door – a door which must be
opened during flight to enable the pilots to use the lavatory and gain access
to the passenger cabin as required for other purposes. Any passageway into the
cockpit, no matter how well fortified, still holds the potential of a threat to
the flight deck.
Ø
It is worth
noting that the respected airline El Al uses two doors on all of its
aircraft to protect the flight deck, along with a team of air marshals on each
flight and an armed guard who protects an entrance zone in front of the door
near the passengers. Per El Al
procedures, the doors are never opened simultaneously to help ensure that
unauthorized access to the flight deck is denied. While we strongly support the installation of a new, hardened
flight deck door on U.S. aircraft as an additional layer of security, we should
not fool ourselves into thinking that they are sufficient to protect the flight
crew under all circumstances.
Ø
The cost of
arming and training pilots is too high.
There
is no question that there will be some expense associated with training pilots
and equipping them with firearms. The program that we envision would require 48
hours of intensive training and recurrent proficiency training. However, from
the research that we have done on this issue, the cost of training and
equipping pilots to carry firearms is the most efficient and cost-effective
measure that the airlines can take to guard against further hijackings, bar
none. In fact, these costs will be a mere fraction of the billions proposed for
other, less effective security enhancements.
S. 2554 even proposes that the government pay the cost of training,
which relieves the airlines from any cost concerns. Lastly, we must consider
how many billions of dollars have been drained, and will be drained, from the
national economy because airline pilots were not armed on September 11, 2001.
Ø
Airlines face
liability if an armed pilot makes a mistake. This concern is satisfactorily addressed
in S. 2554 by pre-empting liability of the carriers and pilots for actions
relating to protection of the flight deck.
Ø
Pilots are too
busy flying the aircraft to use a gun. Pilots are
trained to do numerous tasks simultaneously – individuals who cannot do so are
unable to become airline pilots. One of
the tasks that they must be prepared to perform is using fire extinguishers if
a fire breaks out in the cockpit, regardless of other pressing duties. A suggestion that pilots should ignore the
fire and continue to fly the aircraft would be ludicrous; yet some have
suggested that pilots should ignore terrorists breaking into the cockpit and
continue to fly the aircraft. To be
blunt, it is very difficult to fly an airplane when someone is actively trying
to kill you, and impossible if they are successful.
Ø
An accidental
discharge could damage the aircraft and/or injure someone. This country made a decision
approximately 40 years ago that use of firearms by airborne federal officers
was necessary to protect against hijackings.
Some of the arguments that have been raised against arming pilots must,
to be consistent, also be raised against armed Federal Air Marshals (FAMs),
namely: bullets could pierce the fuselage and cause rapid decompression; an
accidental discharge could injure or kill someone; or, an aircraft system could
be damaged by gunfire. We have, rightly so, made a decision to accept those
potential outcomes as manageable risks because there is a need for an armed law
enforcement presence onboard the aircraft.
No one has more knowledge of what can happen on the aircraft, nor will
anyone be more conscientious about using a firearm onboard, than the pilot.
Further,
contrary to Hollywood movie depictions of aircraft exploding in midair as a
result of the discharge of a firearm in the cabin, virtually no danger exists
that multiple gunshots could cause rapid decompression of a transport-category
aircraft. The shooting proficiency that we recommend for the flight deck
officer program exceeds that of federal law enforcement agents in order to
minimize the possibility of a stray round hitting an innocent passenger or
crewmember. If a weapon did cause rapid decompression during a struggle for
control of the aircraft, that event would pale in comparison to the plane
crashing into a building and killing all on board.
Ø
Federal Air
Marshals (FAMs) on airliners make arming pilots unnecessary. ALPA has historically been a strong
supporter of the FAM program, and we envision the flight deck officer program
as an extension of the FAMs. However,
the number of FAMs is limited and will certainly never be sufficient to provide
protection on each flight. Furthermore,
a large band of terrorists could overpower the FAM team – difficult though that
might be – and turn its attention to the flight deck, using the FAMs’ weapons.
Ultimately, the flight crew must be able to defend the cockpit regardless of
what other resources may be in the cabin.
Ø
We need to keep
guns out of airplanes.
Incredibly, even a former high-ranking transportation official recently
expressed this view on television. The truth is that law enforcement officers
carry many weapons on our airplanes every day of the year with very few
problems. Furthermore, a significant
percentage of our members are former military and/or law enforcement officers
who have defended this country and its neighborhoods using firearms. To suggest that these brave men and women
should not be entrusted with lethal means to defend the flight deck against a
lethal threat is, intentional or not, highly insulting to them. The argument to
keep guns out of airplanes is also nullified by our nation’s decision to place
armed FAMs on flights, as we have already said. To reiterate another previous point, the debate about arming
pilots is really one about arming sworn federal officers who are responsible
for flying the aircraft.
Ø
No more
terrorist attacks like those experienced on September 11th will occur. This sentiment is merely wishful thinking
and cannot be substantiated. In fact, the intelligence community and the TSA
strongly indicate that the threat to aviation is still very high.
Federal Flight
Deck Officer Program Specifics
S. 2554 recognizes that an evaluation of
the specifics of this program is needed, to include selection of the best
alternative from several feasible options in the areas of selection and
training, tactics, and weapon carriage and stowage. In anticipation of the program’s development, we would like to
offer some preliminary recommendations on these issues, some of which are
addressed in the pending bill.
Selection and Training
Ø
In concert with
ALPA’s One Level of Security goal, the program should be available to every
commercial airline pilot, regardless of the size of the aircraft or whether it
carries passengers or cargo. No
arbitrary limits should be placed on the number of pilots allowed to fly armed.
Ø
Weapon custody
policy should be designed to be as practical as possible, while accomplishing
the goal of effective lethal force cockpit protection.
Ø
Pilots
volunteering for the program should be chosen in a manner similar to that used
to select any federal law enforcement officer, including suitability for
application of lethal force.
Ø
Training should
include instruction on basic safety, weapon maintenance, retention, liability,
force continuum and other appropriate subject matter, as is provided to federal
law enforcement agents.
Ø
Training should
be limited to the scope of protecting the flight deck.
Ø
The live-fire
portion of training should be designed for the surgical application of lethal
force at distances appropriate to protecting the flight deck.
Ø
Flight
deck-specific Fire Arms Training Scenarios (FATS) should be created to provide
virtual shoot/no-shoot exercises to help teach the student judgment concerning
use of the weapon.
Ø
Simunitions
(i.e., high-tech paint balls shot from a firearm) training, which is used by
the FAM program, should be provided for live "perpetrator" assaults
in a cockpit simulator using modified versions of the officer’s actual firearm.
This realism would be an excellent tool for building confidence and teaching
judgment.
Ø
All training
required by the program can be accomplished in a week, with approximately 48
hours of instruction. A longer program
will pose increased scheduling difficulties for the pilots and airlines
involved.
Ø
The firearm
should be individually issued and available for training and proficiency.
Pilots will be encouraged to maintain proficiency on their own time. Shooting
proficiency re-qualification should be conducted at least annually, but
semi-annually or more frequently is preferred.
Ø
The care of the
firearm should be the responsibility of the individual, with the exception of
parts replacement and other periodic armory maintenance.
Tactics
Ø
The firearm is
viewed as an additional, essential piece of emergency equipment. The pilot
should be trained to a demonstrated level of proficiency.
Ø
The firearm
will be deployed in the same fashion as any other piece of emergency equipment.
In accordance with standard operating procedures, the pilot not flying (PNF)
will be responsible for responding to a terrorist attack and the pilot flying
(PF) will fly the aircraft.
Ø
The firearm
will be used exclusively to defend the flight deck.
Ø
Training will
include different types of tactical responses, to reflect the types of assaults
that may be encountered.
Ø
Lethal force
will be used with surgical precision against assailants who are at very close
range. Multiple assailants wearing some type of body armor will be expected and
tactics appropriate to defend against such individuals will be deployed.
Weapon Carriage and Stowage
Ø
There are many
types of holsters and other retention devices available, depending on the
selected tactical approach. The chest pack appears to be a practical solution
for rapid deployment and comfort. There is an accommodation for an additional
magazine in this device.
Ø
The standard
method of weapon custody by law enforcement agencies calls for the individual
to carry the weapon on his person at all times. This may not be the most
practical approach for pilots, considering the limited scope of flight deck
protection and the implication of carrying the weapon frequently while
deadheading. ALPA has suggested that firearms could be stored on the aircraft,
in airline flight operations areas or carried at all times. Airlines, with
pilot input, should determine what type of weapon carriage works best for their
operation. This may be dependent on the type of aircraft flown and other
variables.
Ø
FAMs use a
locked box to store their weapons while laying over on international flights.
Such a storage paradigm may be useful for airline pilots, who already store
their flight bags in operations facilities at overnight airports.
Ø
Protection
against accidental discharges (ADs) is a primary consideration and must be kept
foremost in mind for purposes of training, weapon selection and stowage
decisions.
Ø
Most ADs occur
when the status of the weapon is checked or changed, primarily when loading and
unloading. Maintaining the weapon in operational status has historically proven
to be the safest option.
Ø
The firearm
should be available for practice and proficiency training for the pilot.
Ø
There are
several options available to address the challenges inherent in weapon
carriage. There are devices that render the weapon into non-gun status, plus
locks and containers designed to limit access to them by unauthorized persons.
Ø
International
operations require separate considerations. Some or all of these may be solved
by means of bilateral agreements currently in place and used by FAMs.
Access
Control and Identity Verification Systems
ALPA has been promoting the need for
positive, electronic verification of identity and electronic airport access
control systems since 1987 – shortly after the downing of PSA flight 1771 by an
armed, disgruntled, former airline employee.
This mass murder, which bore similarities to the hijackings of September
11th, was attributable in large measure to identity-verification
inadequacies that have yet to be addressed 14 years later.
At ALPA’s urging, the FAA required
approximately 200 of the largest commercial airports to install computerized
access control systems in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. However, in spite of the entire aviation
industry’s arguments to the contrary, the agency failed to (1) create a
detailed set of performance standards for use by the airport operator community
and (2) provide for the access control and identification needs of the
transient airline employee population.
As confirmed by the GAO in a 1995 report, this mismanagement was, and
still is, expensive for the airports and airlines – the initial estimate of
about $170 million for access controls actually rose to more than $600 million,
and the figures continue to climb.
There are also numerous costs that are difficult or impossible to
compute stemming from the inefficiencies related to transient airline
employee’s lack of access at airports.
In the mid-1990’s, the FAA, at ALPA’s
urging and with congressional funding, conducted a test of what came to be
called the Universal Access System (UAS).
Two million taxpayer dollars were spent on those tests involving two
major airlines and four large airports.
For all practical purposes, those funds were wasted. Although the FAA completed successful tests
of the UAS and standards were finalized for the system in 1998, there was no
implementation by any airline of the system, per stated congressional
intent. This failure came as a result
of an FAA policy to leave UAS implementation to the sole discretion of the
carriers.
Although magnetic stripe technology was
used as the basis for UAS tests, there are now several advanced, mature
technologies that could be used to positively identify authorized
personnel. FAA last year completed a
study of a smart card-based system for identifying armed law enforcement
officers. The Department of
Transportation (DOT) has begun the development of a multi-modal Transportation
Worker Identification Card (TWIC) system that is also based on the smart
card.
Smart card technology is much more secure
than magnetic stripe technology and has the additional capability of storing an
extensive amount of data that can be used for both security and other types of
uses. We have identified a number of
applications for these cards within a UAS or TWIC system, including:
Armed Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) identity verification. It is very disturbing that the TSA has
failed to implement a system for positively verifying the identity of armed
LEO’s who travel on commercial aircraft.
Because of this failure, it is impossible to know with confidence that
each person who brings a firearm onto our aircraft are actually employed as a
police officer, Federal Air Marshal or federal agent. News reports indicate that Al Qaeda has a copy of the GAO’s 2000
report on access control deficiencies at federal office buildings and airports,
so they are aware of our system’s weakness in this regard. A smart card system, or its equivalent, is
needed to address this ongoing hazard.
Electronic manifest and positive passenger-bag match. Smart cards could also be used effectively
to create an electronic manifest for each flight. The card would be presented by the traveler at the ticket
counter, at which time flight and baggage data for a particular flight would be
recorded on the card. The card would
then be read at the gate as the passenger boards to create a highly accurate
manifest and log a passenger onto the airplane.
This
information could also be used in connection with a positive passenger-bag
match system to, among other things, (1) positively identify each person and
bag on the aircraft (2) reduce the potential of boarding someone who has not
been through screening (3) create a strong deterrence against fraudulent
ticketing, and (4) quickly identify a bag(s) that must be removed in the event
that its owner does not board the flight.
Federal employee access control and identity verification. The President’s budget for FY 1998 called
for adoption of “…smart card technology
so that, ultimately, every Federal employee will be able to use one card for a
wide range of purposes, including travel, small purchases, and building access.” The General Services Administration has
facilitated significant progress toward that goal for federal agency
facilities. However, airports should
also be equipped to enable smart card access by the tens of thousands of new
federal employees of the TSA, current FAA and NTSB inspectors, and others.
Positive access control for all
employees who work at the airport, not just non-transients. Airline pilots and other transient
employees currently rely on a very non-secure method of moving around airports,
which creates the potential for security breaches. Specifically, they request airport-based, company employees to
open doors for them as a courtesy based on their possession of an airline ID
card. As we know, ID cards and uniforms
can be fraudulently used to gain access, which underscores the need for
electronic verification.
Positive verification of identity
at the screening checkpoint to enable transient employees to be processed more
quickly. Airline passengers are enduring long lines
at the security screening checkpoint.
These lines are made longer by the screening of pilots, flight
attendants and other individuals in positions of trust, who are often screened
several times a day. The lack of equipment for positively identifying these
individuals wastes limited screening resources and further inconveniences the
traveling public.
Identity verification of jumpseat
riders. Use of the flight deck jumpseat by commuting
pilots is an absolute necessity in today’s airline environment. Unfortunately,
that privilege has been severely curtailed since shortly after the terrorist
attacks because there is no way to positively verify the jumpseat requester’s
identity and employment status.
A platform for digital pilot
licenses and medical information.
Consistent with a provision in the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act of 2001, we recommend that the UAS/TWIC card also be used by the FAA for
containing a pilot’s license and medical information. ALPA is working with FAA Flight Standards on this concept. Smart cards have more than sufficient memory
for this purpose and others that the airlines may develop.
This past March, eight of the major
aviation organizations, including ALPA, wrote to the Director of the Office of
Homeland Security and the Under Secretary for Transportation Security to
recommend action on the TWIC program, which is languishing. Specifically, we recommended the
establishment of an independent, not-for-profit organization of stakeholders –
TSA, OHS, other government agencies, airports, airlines, labor, equipment
manufacturers, system integrators, et al. – which would be tasked with the
development and testing of all necessary specifications, rules and principles,
subject to final approval by the government.
This concept is analogous to the coordinated entities which created the
banking industry’s ATM card system and the ongoing efforts of the non-profit
RTCA to develop specifications minimum operating standards for commercial
aircraft avionics.
No response has been received to this
letter to date, but we are convinced that our recommendation to create a
standards organization is a very valid one.
We are greatly concerned that the TSA’s current direction on TWIC will
produce a massive government system that will be very cumbersome, expensive and
unresponsive to aviation’s needs. We
strongly solicit the Committee’s support in our endeavor to create a policy and
technical standards organization for the TWIC.
CARGO
SECURITY
A few years ago, ALPA embarked on a
successful campaign to achieve One Level of Safety for all commercial
airlines. We are currently promoting a
similar objective, One Level of Security, to obtain an equivalent security
environment for all commercial operators, regardless of the size of aircraft
they fly or whether they transport passengers or cargo. The Aviation and Transportation Security
Act’s provisions were mainly directed toward passenger operators, however, we
believe that additional consideration needs to be given to cargo operators. The TSA has noted that “the events of
September 11, 2001, demonstrate the ability to use aircraft to endanger persons
on the ground. An aircraft so used is
just as dangerous whether it holds cargo or passengers.”
We believe that serious security
vulnerabilities exist in the cargo sector of the transportation system. The TSA recently required all-cargo
operators to adopt a security program, which is a step in the right
direction. However, those operators who
had maintained a voluntary security program under FAA oversight were
“grandfathered” into a “limited” security program which provides the lowest
level of security cited in the regulations.
Conspicuously absent in the limited security program for cargo operators
is any kind of requirement governing acceptance and screening of cargo, as an
example.
Some of our other primary concerns that
are specific to cargo security include:
Captain’s authority. Some cargo operators allow their employees
to ride in seats located outside the flight deck as a means of saving money on
airfares, and as an employee benefit. The
management of one large cargo airline is currently challenging the captain’s
authority to determine whether employees may be prohibited from carriage on his
airplane due to security concerns.
Carriage of employees and other personnel. Related to the issue of captain’s authority,
cargo airlines may carry non-employees in the back of the aircraft to perform
certain duties. An example of such
non-employees would be animal handlers, who may board the aircraft with firearms,
large hypodermic needles and other items that could conceivably be used against
the flight crew. Some carriers’
procedures call for the captain to leave the door unlocked (on those aircraft
that have doors installed) when a flight crewmember leaves the flight deck to
visit the lavatory or galley. There are
frequently no known, trusted individuals onboard the aircraft to assist the
flight crew by securing the door in such cases.
Security Identification Display Area. The airport operators, in consultation with
passenger airlines and with the approval of the TSA, creates SIDA boundaries
inside of which everyone is required to wear an identification badge and be
subject to challenge if such badge is not visible. Cargo operations are not normally included within the SIDA,
unless they happen to be conducted inside of passenger airline operational
areas. Access to these aircraft on
isolated parts of the airport is easily accomplished – reports from our pilots
indicate that security monitoring, surveillance and screening procedures around
cargo aircraft are minimal at best.
This creates the potential for terrorist sabotage, hijackings, and other
types of security violations.
Cargo screening. There is no requirement for items carried
aboard cargo airliners to be screened – these operators implement the “known
shipper” concept instead. This fact
gives rise to the potential for numerous ways in which security may be
breached, which includes the carriage of explosive devices. One scenario that we have envisioned is for
terrorists hidden in a container to be boarded on a cargo aircraft, without
knowledge of the crew. Another problem
is that screening is not conducted for chemical or biological agents, like
anthrax. We are aware of a shipment of
a radioactive substance from Sweden to Louisiana earlier this year that emitted
radiation through its container at very dangerous levels.
While we recognize the financial and
logistical implications of screening all cargo, there is surely a reasonable
and practical approach to enhancing this area of security that can be applied
to begin improving the status quo.
Cargo operators that rely heavily on a “known shipper” concept as a
single prevention and deterrence strategy ignore the fact that such a system
may be compromised by fraudulently obtaining a bona fide customer account
number.
Accordingly, we offer our support for S.
2656, a pending bill that would require the TSA to develop and submit a
detailed plan on cargo security. We
recommend that this bill include a provision for consultation with pilots and
others who have direct knowledge of cargo-related security needs in the
development of this plan. We also
support S. 2668, another pending bill that addresses the security of cargo
carried by passenger and all-cargo operators.
PENDING
SENATE BILLS
Following are some brief comments on
several pending bills before this Committee.
S. 1980, Training program for all airline
personnel responsible for checking passenger identification, and for other
purposes
– We wholeheartedly endorse the concept of positive verification of passenger’s
identification. However, there are so
many forms of identification, and so many ways to easily create fraudulent
credentials, that we believe that it is practically impossible to create a
training system that will produce the kinds of results that are desired. A trusted traveler program, whereby an
individual voluntarily submits to background checks and identity verification,
is an alternative concept for this same objective and it is being pursued by
numerous airlines.
We also endorse the concept of using
biometrics for identifying passengers, but we believe that such technology
should first be used for employees, as they have much greater access to secured
areas than do passengers.
S. 2497, To prohibit the opening of
cockpit doors in flight – In order to comply with various federal
aviation regulations, and meet physiological needs, it is necessary for flight
crews to open cockpit doors while in flight.
The bill’s provision for a mantrap, therefore, is certainly one that
ALPA supports in order to enhance flight deck security and the security of
flight crewmembers.
S. 2554, Arming Pilots Against Terrorism
and Cabin Defense Act of 2002. As
discussed previously, ALPA fully supports this bill and urges the Committee to
ensure its passage by the full Senate.
S.
2642, Background checks of alien flight school applicants. We support the intent of this bill to
require background checks for alien student pilots.
S. 2656, Cargo security. We support the intent of this bill, as noted
previously, and recommend the inclusion of a requirement for the TSA to consult
with affected pilot organizations in the development of the security plan
required in this bill.
S. 2668, Air cargo security act. ALPA supports the intent of this bill, as
noted previously.
S. 2686, Airport employee whistleblower
protection. We endorse the broadening of whistleblower
protection to cover certain additional classes of employers, including the
federal government, of security screeners.
Thank you for the opportunity to present
this testimony. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you may have.