

**STATEMENT OF  
CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT  
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**WASHINGTON, D.C.  
JULY 24, 2008**

Good morning, Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, and members of the Subcommittee. On behalf of the 55,000 ALPA pilots who fly for 40 airlines in the U.S. and Canada, thank you for this opportunity.

In a real sense, *pilots are security in the air*. That is why our union has pushed so hard—and continues to advocate—for better procedures, training, and technologies that let us stay one step ahead of those who would try again. Since 9/11, working in tandem with government officials and industry stakeholders, ALPA has helped implement several

initiatives that have become the layered security protections we depend on.

The most recent example is *CrewPASS*, which was launched just one week ago at three airports. *CrewPASS*, an ALPA-conceived program, is used by TSA officers to verify a pilot's identity and employment status in real time.

This procedure reduces congestion and passenger wait times at screening checkpoints, enabling transportation screening officers and behavioral detection officers to better protect the traveling public by focusing on those who may possess harmful intent—instead of diverting valuable security resources on known, vetted, and trusted pilots.

ALPA has provided the computer equipment for TSA employees to administer the program during the test phase,

briefed our members, and made this information available to other U.S. airline pilots.

Just one week into the test, ALPA has tallied over 3,000 pilots who have used this enhanced security system. ALPA's Security Team has received positive reports on CrewPass from our pilots and from the TSA—and we fully expect TSA to continue and expand the program after the 60-day test period.

We urge you to appropriately fund the technology and resources needed to implement the program nationwide. We know it enhances security, and we believe it will save the TSA both time and money.

Another security success story is the Federal Flight Deck Officer program. TSA has proclaimed the FFDO program one of its top 20 successful security initiatives;

however, after five years, it needs some review and improvement.

For example, an appropriately sized and organized management structure is sorely needed to supervise thousands of FFDOs. Effective oversight of the entire program cannot be exercised by the Federal Air Marshal Service with just 20 people. ALPA also believes the government should reimburse FFDOs—an all-volunteer security force—for their out-of-pocket costs associated with training.

Some airlines refuse to accommodate requests by their pilots to attend the initial and recurrent FFDO training, forcing pilots to use personal time to become armed officers who defend our airliners. We believe these volunteers deserve the same leave rights from their airline employers to

complete their FFDO training as those citizens performing Reserve or National Guard military duty.

Protecting the flight deck doesn't end with the FFDO program. ALPA believes that the installation of flight-deck secondary barriers would supplement the protection offered by the reinforced cockpit door. These barriers can provide tremendous increases in security against another hostile takeover of a flight deck for very few dollars.

Secondary barriers will create the precious seconds for pilots and flight attendants to react if a flight deck is attacked when the cockpit door is opened in flight. In fact, two major U.S. passenger airlines have begun equipping their aircraft with secondary barriers, and others have stated they are waiting for the development and approval by the

FAA for secondary barriers manufacture and installation standards.

ALPA asks the Subcommittee to consider funding an initiative to develop design standards, test existing prototypes, and create the standardized procedures for flight crewmembers.

These secondary barriers are especially needed on cargo aircraft, which, almost unbelievably, often do not have even a cockpit door to separate the pilots from persons on board who could pose an in-flight threat.

Unfortunately, this is just one item on ALPA's long list of security concerns for air-cargo operations. Cargo airlines continue to fly under the regulatory radar, dodging implementation items in the final rule on Air Cargo Security

Requirements. The fact is that far too many cargo operations continue to fall short of “One Level of Safety and Security.”

In spite of the improvements brought by the Air Cargo Final Rule, significant gaps still remain in the protections provided for cargo aircraft and their crews. Our concerns in this regard were provided in testimony to the Homeland Security Committee last week.

For the 55,000 pilots I represent, 9/11 doesn't seem like seven years ago—it seems like yesterday. With the image of four lost airliners, their passengers, and their crewmembers as our backdrop, we work every day to make our industry more secure. And because of the additional layers of security that you have already mandated, you have added to the probability of stopping the next threat. Thank you for all

you have done since all of us agreed that we would never forget.